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The Eects of Germany’s New Minimum Wage




In January 2015, Germany introduced a federal, statutory minimum wage of 8.50€ per
hour. This study evaluates the effects of this policy on regular and marginal employment
and on welfare dependency. Based on county-level administrative data, this study uses
the difference-in-differences technique, exploiting regional variation in the bite of the
minimum wage, i.e. the county-specific share of employees paid less than 8.50€ before
the introduction of the minimum wage. The minimum wage had a considerable negative
effect on marginal employment. There is also some indication that regular employment
was slightly reduced. Concerning welfare dependency, the minimum wage reduced the
number of working welfare recipients, with some indication that about one half of them
left welfare receipt due to the minimum wage.
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1 Motivation
On the 1st of January 2015, Germany introduced a federal, statutory minimum wage
of 8.50€ per hour. There were some fears about negative employment effects of this
new policy. However, proponents of the minimum wage, such as the German So-
cial Democrats (SPD, 2013), argued that apprehensions regarding job losses were un-
grounded. In fact, a minimum wage would be necessary to supplement earnings in
the growing low-wage sector and to cushion the large-scale labor market reforms of
the early 2000s, the so-called Hartz reforms. A key target group of the minimum wage
are households that receive supplementary welfare benefits (unemployment benefit II,
UBII) while working, the so-called Aufstocker. The proponents of the minimum wage
argued that increasing the labor earnings via the minimum wage would reduce welfare
spending and help households to end their welfare dependency.
At first glance, the labor market outcomes since the reform seem rather comforting.
The Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS, 2015) reports that after the
introduction of the minimum wage unemployment actually fell and that regular employ-
ment is at an all time high, although there was some loss of marginal employment.1 The
ministry estimates that 3.7 million employees profited from higher labor earnings. The
number of the Aufstocker dropped by 50,000 and related welfare expenditures on UBII
were expected to decrease by 0.9bn€. The ministry concludes that the "minimum wage
works" (BMAS, 2015).
Without a doubt, Germany introduced the minimum wage in times of a healthy labor
market and solid economic circumstances. However, it is impossible to determine the
causal effects of the minimum wage just based on the aggregate employment and social
security statistics. Accordingly, this study evaluates the effects of the statutory minimum
wage on employment and welfare dependency using county-level administrative data.
In order to construct a credible counter-factual, i.e., the development of the labor market
under the absence of the minimum wage, identification is based on variations in the
relative depth of the intervention on regional level.
The analysis for employment effects will focus on the impact on both, regular and
marginal employment, where the latter refers to so-called Minijobs, which are fully social-
security exempt (up to 450€ per month). Regarding welfare dependency, there will be a
distinction between those who are capable of working, but do not work while receiving
UBII payments and those who are working, but top-up their labor earnings with UBII
(Aufstocker). Also the composition of the Aufstocker will be considered: I separate the
analysis according to labor income brackets2 and employment status (self-employed or
1Regular employment (sozialversicherungspflichtige Beschäftigung) refers to jobs subject to social se-
curity contributions, i.e. with an average monthly income of more than 450€. Jobs below or just
paying 450€ are exempt from these contributions and constitute marginal employment (geringfügige
Beschäftigung.).
2There are three different categories, based on the rules regarding social security contributions: First,
fully social-security exempt (Minijobs, up to 450€ p.m); second, the phase-in zone for social security
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dependently employed). Furthermore I will evaluate the effects of the minimum wage
on the regional wage distribution.
The results suggest that the minimum wage had a considerable negative effect
on marginal employment. A back-off-the-envelope calculation indicates that in 2015
150,000-200,000 marginal jobs have been lost, due to the minimum wage. Concerning
regular employment, the results indicate a rather small (short-run) negative effect of
the minimum wage. Concerning welfare dependency, the minimum wage reduced the
number of working welfare recipients, with some indication that about one half of them
left welfare receipt due to the minimum wage. The effect on welfare reduction in absolute
terms is rather small.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the insti-
tutional background and briefly summarizes the previous studies on employment and
welfare effects. Section 3 describes the identification strategy, the different outcome
variables, and presents the data. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Minimum Wages in Germany
Background and Institutional Factors Germany introduced a statutory, federal mini-
mum wage as a response to a large variety of economic and political trends. Traditionally,
the majority of wages in West Germany have been determined by collective wage bar-
gaining. Hence, trade unions and employers associations alike opposed minimum wages
as interference with their autonomous wage- setting. However, with declining coverage
of collective agreements starting in the 1990s, and increasing dispersion of gross labor
income and equivalized net income3, trade unions began to favor broadly applicable,
legal wage floors.
Germany started to introduce sectoral minimum wages from 1997 onwards, using
the legislation on the posting of workers (Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz). The majority of
the covered branches are in the crafts and construction sector and were introduced in
order to shield domestic firms against foreign competitors who are also subject to the
minimum wages if they operate in Germany.
Minimum wages became also politically more desirable as a means to supplement
and cushion the large-scale labor market reforms of the early 2000s, the so-called Hartz
reforms.4 The reforms attempted to lower reservation wages and introduced new forms
of marginal employment, exempt from social security contributions (so-called Minijobs).
contributions (Midijob, between 450€ and 850€ p.m.) and third, regular employment (more than
850€ p.m., fully subject to payroll taxes)
3See among others Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2007); Antonczyk et al. (2010, 2011); Biewen and Juhasz (2012);
Card et al. (2013). This upward trend in inequality was most pronounced from German unification in
the early 1990s till the mid 2000s. Income inequality stabilized in more recent years (c.f. Grabka and
Goebel, 2014; Möller, 2016).
4For an overview, see Ochel (2005).
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It is often argued that the reform package stimulated the expansion of the low-wage
sector.5 The Hartz reforms also encouraged the use of welfare payments as an implicit
combination wage. Households with low labor earnings can supplement their income
with the unemployment benefit II (UBII) to reach subsistence level. People making use
of this provision are commonly referred to as Aufstocker, literally "those who top-up".
Some researchers argue that these reforms are (at least partially) responsible for the
success of the German labor market and the German economy in the last decade (Carlin
and Soskice, 2009; Boysen-Hogrefe and Groll, 2010; Gartner and Klinger, 2010; Burda
and Hunt, 2011). Yet, there is disagreement of its relative importance compared to other
factors, such as wage moderation (Akyol et al., 2013; Dustmann et al., 2014).
Proponents of the minimum wage, such as Rürup and Heilmann (2012) or the So-
cial Democrats (SPD, 2013) argue that the introduction of a general minimum wage is
necessary to counter the negative effects of the new low-pay sector and will increase the
efficiency of the combination wage scheme, since the Aufstocker will obtain a larger share
of their income from work and not from transfers. Assuming the absence of detrimental
employment effects,6 a modestly set minimum wage would be beneficial for the public
budget, due to the reduction in supplementary welfare payments for the Aufstocker
and increases in payroll and income taxes. The Social Democrats, the driving force in
introducing the minimum wage, argued that the minimum wage would generate a fiscal
surplus of 7bn€ per year (SPD, 2013, pg. 69).7
After the federal election in Autumn 2013 and the change of government, the political
climate shifted in favor of a statutory minimum wage.8 In January 2015 a minimum wage
of 8.50€ per hour was intoduced. The minimum wage passed into law in the summer of
20149, only few exemptions apply.10 Sectoral minimum wages remain unaffected.
5The low-wage sector is usually defined as wages below 2/3 of the median wage. The share of jobs
considered to be in the low-wage sector increased between the 1997 and 2007 from ca 16 to 22% and
remained constant afterwards. However, most of that increase took place already before the Hartz
reforms (Schäfer and Schmidt, 2012; Brenke, 2012).
6Standard economic theory about minimum wages predicts unambiguous negative effects and involun-
tary unemployment. However, as for instance argued in Manning (2003); Garloff (2010), a minimum
wage does not necessarily need to reduce employment because of some monopsony power of the
employers, for instance due to search frictions (Card and Krueger, 2015).
7This claim is based on Ehrentraut et al. (2011) who calculate the fiscal effects of a minimum wage,
assuming the absence of negative emplyoment effects.
8Chancellor Merkel (Christian Democrats) remained in office, but the Social Democrats replaced the
Liberals as the coalition partner.
9The German Bundestag voted for the minimum wage on 3 July 2014, the second chamber Bundesrat
confirmed the law on 11 July 2014. The law became effective on 16 August 2014.
10Apprentices, compulsory internships, long-term unemployed for the first six month.
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The following literature review will present the evidence on the economic effects of
minimum wages in Germany.11 I will focus on the empirical insights from ex-ante and
ex-post studies concerning employment effects and welfare dependency.12
Employment Eects There are various ex-ante studies on the effects of a statutory
minimum wage.13 These simulations generally point to rather substantial employment
losses, but the variation of potential effects is large (for a comparisson, see Müller, 2009).
Concerning the sectoral minimum wages, there is also a large body of ex-post studies.14
Not surprisingly, these studies indicate that the bite, i.e. the share of directly affected
workers matters a lot for the effects of minimum wages. In West Germany, the sectoral
minimum wages were usually comparatively low. Hence, employment effects have been
very small or not statistically significant. Moreover, spillover effects might be an issues,
i.e. minimum wages can affect the wage distribution above the level of the wage floor.
There are also several studies that analyze descriptively or with ex-post evaluations
the employment effects of minimum wage. Based on aggregate employment statistics
Groll (2015) shows descriptively that there is a striking reduction of marginal employment
in the beginning of 2015. Vom Berge et al. (2016) study data on individual transitions
and show that there is no large flow into unemployment, but indeed transitions from
marginal to regular employment. Based on the IAB Establishment Panel, Bossler (2016)
and Bossler and Gerner (2016) exploit the self-declared affectedness of establishments
by the minimum wage and detect a small negative effect on employers’ employment
expectations (before the reform) and estimate a reduction in employment growth of
60,000 jobs due to the minimum wage. Garloff (2016) uses regional data of the Federal
Employment Agency and does not find any evidence for a decrease of employment
growth or an increase in unemployment growth. His results suggest that there was a
transformation from marginal into regular employment. Knabe et al. (2016) argue that a
simple East/West comparison can already detect effects of the minimum wages, since
East Germany is much more exposed to the minimum wage than most of the West. They
consider aggregate employment statistics and argue that the minimum wage had an effect
on labor market dynamics. In 2015, overall employment grew by 300,000 jobs; however,
only by 0.2% in the East compared tp 0.9% in the West. Additionally, they conclude that
even if there was some transformation of marginal into regular employment, not all
marginal jobs have been upgraded.
11For a general overview about the empirics of minimum wages see Brown (1999); Neumark and Wascher
(2008), for a European focus Dolado et al. (1996).
12For a discussion about the theoretical arguments concerning minimum wages in the German context
see Fitzenberger (2009).
13Among others Bachmann et al. (2008); Bauer et al. (2009); Knabe and Schöb (2009); Müller and Steiner
(2011); Knabe et al. (2014); Arni et al. (2014); Henzel and Engelhardt (2014).
14Among others Möller and König (2008); Müller (2010); Boockmann et al. (2013); Frings (2013); Aretz
et al. (2012, 2013); Gregory (2014); Rattenhuber (2014).
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Eects on Welfare Dependency Proponents of the minimum wage argue that it could
lift poor households, such as the Aufstocker out of welfare. Some of the ex-ante studies
(e.g. Bachmann et al., 2008; Müller and Steiner, 2009; Bauer et al., 2009; Knabe and
Schöb, 2009; Knabe et al., 2014; Arni et al., 2014) do not only analyze the employment,
but also the fiscal effects of a minimum wage. These studies commonly find that the
effects on the Aufstocker and welfare dependency are very small or negligible and usually
offset by negative employment effects, which are especially severe for this group. The
vast majority of the Aufstocker is found to remain in welfare receipt, either because of
the household context (single parents, many children), hours constraints (disabilities,
child care), or both of it. Additionally, Müller and Steiner (2009) estimate that only
25% of the gross income increase due to a minimum wage sticks with households and
further argue that minimum wages are not well-targeted for poverty reduction, since
they also affect secondary earners in households above the poverty line. In a more
recent account, Bruckmeier and Wiemers (2014) argue along similar lines. However,
even if the disposable income of the households would not change much due to high
transfer withdrawal rates, reduced welfare stigma could improve well-being considerably
(c.f. Hetschko et al., 2016).
Bruckmeier and Wiemers (2016) describe the developments for the Aufstocker after
the introduction of the minimum wage and report that their numbers decreased from
December 2014 to January 2015 by 2% (-23,000). This reductions is larger than at previous
turns of the years, mostly driven by former marginally employed Aufstocker. They provide
evidence that in the following months more Aufstocker than before managed to leave
welfare dependency.
Summing Up So far, no evidence for substantial employment losses due to the new
minimum wage exists. There is a loss of marginal employment that seems to be (par-
tially) offset by transformations into regular employment; however, there might be some
reductions in employment dynamics. Since the introduction of the minimum wage
there was a reduction in the number of the Aufstocker, especially those with a marginal
employment. There is tentative evidence that more Aufstocker than before left welfare
receipt due to higher labor earnings.
3 Method
3.1 Identication Strategy
In order to identify the causal effects of the minimum wage on employment and welfare
dependency, this study will exploit regional differences (county level, N=402) in the bite
of the minimum wage as the source of exogenous variation. I will define the bite of the
minimum wage as the county-specific share of workers with wages less than 8.50€ per
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hour before the introduction of the minimum wage.15 Unlike in the United States, where
states can set their own wage floor above the federal minimum wage, in Germany this
kind of regional variation does not exist. However, a uniformly set minimum wage of
8.50€ per hour has rather different repercussions across the country. In prosperous
economic regions, such as Munich or Frankfurt, the vast majority of workers already
receives a wage rate well above 8.50€. On the other hand, 8.50€ is a relatively high wage
rate in most parts of East Germany and also in rural, economically struggling regions
in the West. In that sense, even though the minimum wage is nominally the same in all
regions, the effective strength of the treatment differs considerably. Card (1992) uses this
type of variation in order to study the effects of minimum wages on teenage employment,
Garloff (2016) uses the same data set as this study, but considers employment outcomes
only.
The estimation will make use of observations before and after the policy change,
hence a difference-in-differences (DID) estimator is appropriate. The effect of the min-
imum wage is recovered as the difference between strongly and only mildly "treated"
regions before and after the turn of the year 2014/15. Instead of a binary treatment,
the regional bite of the minimum wage functions as an indicator for the strength of the
treatment. Given that we have a monthly panel running from January 2012 to December
2015 (T=48) of the 402 counties, the difference-in-differences estimator in log-levels can
be implemented as
log(yi t ) = bitei ·D MWt ·βL +
∑
t
D montht ·γt +θi + "i t (1)
where yi t is one of the outcomes of interest
16, measured in period t in county i , the
bitei is the county-specific (but not time-varying) depth of the intervention, interacted
with an indicator variable D MWt which is equal to one for all periods after the introduction
of the minimum wage, i.e. the entire year 2015. Furthermore, Equation 1 features time
fixed effectsγt and county fixed effectsθi . Standard errors are clustered on county level as
advocated by Bertrand et al. (2004). Thus, βL is the parameter of interest. In order to ease
interpretation of βL , the bite will be normalized by one standard deviation and divided
by 100. Hence, the estimate of βL from Equation 1 corresponds to the percentage change
of the outcome variable, due to one additional standard deviation of the county-specific
bite.
Alternatively, one could specify a model of growth rates instead of levels, where only
the left-hand side of Equation 1 is modified, yielding
412 log(yi t ) = log(yi t )− log(yi ,t−12) = bitei ·D MWt ·β +
∑
t
D montht ·γt +θi + "i t (2)
15The details will be presented in the following Section 3.2.
16Regular and marginal employment, working and non-working recipients of UBII. Information on wages
is only available on an annual basis. The specification for the impact on the wage structure will be
presented in Section 4.
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Note that Equation 1 and 2 are two distinct models and the estimated coefficients of
interest, β and βL have entirely different interpretations. For the specification in growth
rates (Equation 2), β provides an estimate for the percentage point change of the annual
month-specific growth rate of the outcome variable, due to one additional standard
deviation of the county-specific bite.
Since the difference-in-differences identification is scale dependent, at best only
one of the two specifications is valid. I will argue graphically in Section 3.4 that the
developments of the outcome variables follow a process modeled more appropriately by
growth rates as in Equation 2 than in log-levels, as specified in Equation 1. The advantage
of the specification in growth rates is that stochastic patterns of seasonality are accounted
for by having the month t -specific seasonally adjusted annual growth rate of yi t on the
left-hand side of the equation.
As in any difference-in-differences estimator, identification rests on the validity
of the comparison between the treatment and control groups. When the treatment
is continuous, all regions are affected by the policy change, but the intensity of the
treatment differs. Regions with a high bite were affected more than those with a low
bite. The standard DID framework with an unambiguously defined binary treatment
requires that the comparison group is unaffected by the treatment. When the treatment
is continuous, the requirement is that regions with a lower bite are proportionally less
affected by the policy. Given this setting, identification rests on two canonical difference-
in-differences assumptions, the common trend and the stable unit treatment value
assumption.
The common trend assumption (CTA) states that in the absence of the policy, the
development of the outcomes of interest should have been parallel in regions which
are highly affected and regions which are only mildly affected by the new policy. For
the specification in log-levels, this implies that percentage changes of the outcome over
time should be unrelated to bite if there would be no minimum wage. For the alternative
specification from Equation 2, the CTA implies that changes in growth rates would not
be systematically related to the bite, if there was no minimum wage.
It is conceivable that regions with a high bite exhibit different trend (or growth
rate) behavior for the outcomes of interest than those with a low bite. This issue will
be addressed with an alternative specification, in which bitei · t ·δ is introduced as an
additional regressor. The term t is a linear time trend and δ a bite-specific linear trend
differential. If the differences in the pre-treatment trend behavior can be adequately
captured with a deterministic linear trend proportional to the bite, β will provide a valid
estimator for the ATT. The causal effects are then recovered as deviations from a pre-
treatment trend differential due to the larger impact of the minimum wage. Section 3.4
compares the trend behavior of the treated and the control groups graphically, in order
to decide whether this alternative specification is appropriate or not.
The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) stipulates that more or less
treated observations do not interfere, so that for example a stronger treatment in one
region does not affect the outcome in another region. It is very likely that the SUTVA does
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not hold in the medium to long run, for instance through firms investment decisions.
A firm with two factories, one in a high wage and one in a low wage region might shift
its investments to the high wage region, due to the change in relative wages between
the two regions. However, these investments and relocation decisions take time and I
assume that they are negligible in the narrow time frame of this study. Also labor mobility
and migration could invalidate the SUTVA; however, as for the decisions of the firms,
I assume that the effects of the minimum wage on labor mobility and migration are
negligible in the first year of the new policy.
Having multiple time periods does not only allow to argue graphically for the validity
of the CTA, but also to study how the effect evolves over time. This is done by specifying
multiple pre- and post-treatment periods, as for instance in Autor (2003). One obtains
a more flexible specification for the annual growth rate in which D MWt is replaced by a
series of indicators:






D montht ·γt +θi + "i t (3)
where τ is an indicator for the periods of interest. Of course, also the (log-)levels specifi-
cation from Equation 1 could be respecified in the fashion of Equation 3. In the analysis,
τwill take seven post-treatment values for lagged adjustment17 and six pre-treatment
values (July - December 2014) for anticipation effects after the minimum wage law was
passed. Also Equation 3 can be supplemented with bitei · t ·δ, if the alternative CTA
(deviations from trend differential) is more appropriate.
Figure 1 provides evidence that shortly already after the passing of the minimum
wage bill, some anticipation effects arose. The figure plots the weekly relative search
intensity for the Google search query "Mindestlohn" originating from Germany for the
years 2013 to 2015 (Google Trends, 2017). The search intensity index is set to 100 for
the week with the highest number of queries relative to all search queries. The graph
shows a first large spike in the first week of July 2014, when the minimum wage was voted
for (light blue vertical line) and a second large spike at the turn of the year when the
minimum wage took effect (dark blue vertical line) Hence, it is likely that the majority of
people was already well-informed about the new minimum wage, half a year before the
official start and that anticipation effects are possible.
17Six month adjustment after introduction (January 2015, February 2015, ..., June 2015) and a joint





































































































Google Trends for Germany − Mindestlohn  between January 2013 and December 2015
Google Trends Minimum Wage
Note: Measured between January 2013 and December 2015, Own Graph, Data: Google Trends (2017)
Figure 1: Google Trends for Search Query "Mindestlohn" over Time
3.2 Measurement of the Bite and Treatments
The bite is calculated based on the wage statistics of the Federal Employment Agency,
an administrative dataset, aggregated on county level, containing the distribution of
gross labor earnings. The statistic is based on social security notifications and refers
to regular, full-time employment (Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2016c). As in
Garloff (2016), all earnings up to 1400€ per month are supposed to be subject to the
minimum wage.18 The bite is calculated as the county specific share of these earnings
in relation to all recorded full-time employees. The wage statistics are available only
once per year, namely in December. In order to avoid anticipation effects, the bite is
calculated based on data from December 2013, hence one year before the introduction
of the new minimum wage.
This measure of the bite has some important caveats. First, there is no information on
hours worked and the calculation is only based on the social security records of full-time
employees. If this lack of information results in a classic symmetric measurement error,
the estimated coefficients and the ATT βˆ would suffer from a downward attenuation bias.
The problem would be exacerbated if there are systematic differences across counties,
18Assuming 4.35 workweeks per month and reasonable 38 hours work week implies a gross hourly wage
rate of 8.47€. As a robustness check, the main results are also replicated with bite measures based on
income thresholds of 1500 and 2000€ per months. The bite measures are highly correlated, hence the
results remain largely unaffected.
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related to the size of the bite, for instance due to differences in the prevalence of part-time
employment. Second, recipients of minimum wages are frequently working in marginal
employment, i.e. jobs not subject to social security contributions and hence not covered
in the wage statistics and in the calculation of the bite. This feature might actually be
desirable for the effects on regular employment, but could potentially be misleading for
marginal employment and for Aufstocker and welfare dependency. Given that there are
neither alternative wage statistics, nor credible instrumental variables available, I will
abstract from these issues and
Figure 2 maps the distribution of the bite across counties. It shows five different
quintiles of the bite in ascending darkness (from light blue to dark purple). The bite
ranges from 2.3% to more than 20%; so variation across regions is substantial. The most
striking pattern is that the entire former GDR - except for Berlin - is in the highest quintile.
This observation matches expectations and echoes the simple East West comparison
used by Knabe et al. (2016), however, as displayed in Figure A1 there is also considerable
variation within East German regions. The variation within West Germany confirms
intuitions: The prosperous regions in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg in the South of
Germany and other metropolitan regions (e.g. Frankfurt Rhine-Main are, Düsseldorf
Rhine-Ruhr, Hamburg) are less affected than more rural and less prosperous areas such
as the south of Rhineland-Palatinate or East Frisia.
Accordingly, I generate two alternative binary treatments. First, by splitting the
counties into those with a bite above and those with a bite below the median bite. This
alternative treatment assumes that only the counties with a large bite -above the median-
are treated, while the other half is not affected. The resulting map is shown in the
Appendix (Figure A2 - left panel). The second alternative binary treatment ignores
counties close to the median on either side, since they are very similar in their exposure
to the new policy. In this robust binary treatment, counties are treated if their bite lies
above the 60th percentile of the bite distribution, counties below the 40th percentile
belong to the control group, and counties close to the median (above 40th and below 6oth
percentile) are excluded. The resulting map is also shown in the Appendix (Figure A2,
right panel).
One can exploit the regional variation in Google search queries to validate the bite
measure. Figure 3 shows the relative search intensity for the term "Mindestlohn" across
federal states in the years 2013 to 2015. The search intensity index is set to 100 in the state
in which it was most popular relative to all search queries (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern). A
value of 50 implies that the term was only half as popular than in the reference region. The
lowest value (42) is observed for Baden-Württemberg (Google Trends, 2017). The map
also uses quintiles of the search intensity distribution. Although the data is only available
at the coarser state level, the resulting map shows that the bite is highly correlated with
interest in the new policy. Regions with a higher bite also have a higher relative search
intensity for the minimum wage. As argued by Askitas and Zimmermann (2009), Google
search queries can be a powerful predictor for the analysis of labor market outcomes.
10








Note: Measured in December 2013







Note: Measured between January 2013 and December 2015, Own Graph, Data: Google Trends (2017)
Figure 3: Relative Search Intensity "Mindestlohn" across Federal States
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3.3 Data
The impact of the minimum wage will be evaluated using the results from four main
outcomes: Concerning the employment effects, regular and marginal employment are
considered. Concerning welfare dependency, the stock of recipients of unemployment
benefit II, who are deemed to be able to work, will be decomposed into those working
(Aufstocker) and those not working (NW UBII).19 In order to get an in-depth look at the
effects for the Aufstocker, I will decompose them based on monthly income (Minijobs,
Midijobs and Maxijobs) and employment status (self-employed or dependently em-
ployed). The county-specific, monthly time series for all four outcomes are provided by
the Federal Employment Agency (Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2016a,b) for
the years 2012 to 2015.
Table 1: Totals for December 2013
Main Outcomes Composition of Aufstocker
Regular Employment 29.88m Self-employed 118,584
Marginal Employment 7.44m Employees 1,189,417
Able to Work - UBII 4.31m Minijobs 639,942
Aufstocker 1.30m Midijobs 233,757
Non-working UBII 3.01m Maxijobs 315,718
Sum over all 402 counties
Table 1 displays the aggregate values of the outcomes of interest for December 2013.
The left column contains the employment and welfare outcomes, the right column the
composition of the Aufstocker. The data contains just short of 30 million regular jobs and
7.5 million marginal jobs. Out of the 4.3 million recipients of UBII who are deemed to
be able to work, about 30% (1.3m) top-up their labor income with welfare payments. In
the public debate, this group was considered a core target group of the minimum wage,
even though economic research (Müller and Steiner, 2009; Bruckmeier and Wiemers,
2014) dampened expectations about the effectiveness of minimum wages. Figure A3
in the Appendix illustrates the composition of the Aufstocker graphically. Circa 9% of
the Aufstocker are self-employed, but do not earn enough. Almost 50% of the Aufstocker
only have a marginal job, paying up to 450€ per month. Table 1 highlights that the vast
majority of marginal jobs are not held by people depending on welfare benefits, but by
people from households that do not receive welfare payments. Marginal jobs are often
held by secondary earners, due to the favorable tax treatment.
19There are also recipients of UBII that are not deemed to be able to work, namely the unfit household
members of those who are able to work and receive UBII. Thus, the overall number of UBII recipients
in Germany is larger.
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Table 2 shows the most important variables for December 2013, i.e. the reference
period for the bite measure. The average bite from the wage statistics is 6.8% and ranges
from 2 to 20%. All outcomes display considerable variations across counties, which is
not surprising, given that these administrative units are very heterogeneous. Recall that
county fixed effects will be included in the estimation and identification is based on
inter-temporal differences. The table does not only feature the outcomes of interest, but
also the average labor earnings in 2013 and 2015 from the wage statistics (Statistik der
Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2016c).20
Table 2: Summary Statistics for December 2013
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Bite 0.068 0.034 0.023 0.202
Regular Employment 211,742 292,078 12,023 1,250,649
Marginal Employment 44,379 50,972 2835 210,496
Aufstocker 11,185 24,996 215 127,939
Non-working UBII 26,183 55,993 550 283,446
Avg Income 2013 3556 628 2220 5082
Avg Income 2015 3723 649 2361 5386
Composition of Aufstocker
Employees 9868 21,018 205 107,192
Self-employed 1420 4297 8 22,128
Minijobs 4951 9955 105 50,849
Midijobs 2174 5004 40 25,309
Maxijobs 2744 6086 42 31,034
N=402 counties, weighted with county-specific employment.
As outlined in Section 3.1, the DID framework will make use of inter-temporal varia-
tion in order to identify the effects of the minimum wage. Figure 4 shows the development
of the four outcomes (in logs) over time. The graphs run from January 2012 to December
2015 showing time series normalized by the value of January 2012. Hence, all lines start at
zero and are growth rates with respect to January 2012. A light blue vertical line indicates
the passing of the minimum wage bill in July 2014, the dark blue vertical line the turn of
the year 2014/15, the introduction of the minimum wage. start of the new policy. Note
20Recall from Section 3.2 that the wage statistics only feature full-time regular employment. The data is
available in 50€ brackets. For each bracket, the mean value is assumed. The data is top-coded. Average
income in the highest bracket is imputed, using a Pareto distribution with α= 2.6. The imputation
for the top income bracket does not affect the bite, given that the bite is defined only as the share of
monthly labor income below 1400 over all full-time employees.
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that the series are not yet separated by treatment or intensity of treatment, which will be
delegated to the following subsection.
In the upper graph, the two employment outcomes are shown. First, the upward
trend for both employment outcomes indicates that Germany introduced the minimum
wage into a very robust and expanding labor market. Not surprisingly, the series exhibits a
stochastic pattern of seasonality. Strikingly, there is a pronounced reduction in marginal
employment exactly after the turn of the year 2014/15. This observation matches the
descriptive evidence concerning marginal employment reported for instance by Groll
(2015). There does not seem to be a comparable movement in the series of regular
employment; however, the relatively small seasonal decrease in the winter 2014/15
could indicate that at least some of the marginal jobs have been converted into regular
employment. The stock of regular employment is about four times as large as the stock of
marginal employment; hence, in a graph displaying growths rates, such a transformation
is certainly difficult to spot.
The lower graph shows the development for the working and non-working recipients
of unemployment benefit II. As in the upper graph, there are strong seasonal patterns;
however, contrarily to the employment outcomes, the patterns appear to be shifted. This
observation indicates that people frequently shift from one category to the other. The
non-working series seems to be pretty stable in its average level prior to the introduction
of the minimum wage. There seems to be a small upward trend in the first months of
2015. Concerning the working UBII recipients (Aufstocker), there seems to be a slight
downward trend before the introduction of the policy; however, this downward trend is
amplified after the passing of the minimum wage bill in July 2014 with a very pronounced
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Figure 4: Employment and Welfare Outcomes over Time
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3.4 Graphical Evidence & Trend Assumptions
The graphs in Figure 4 provide a descriptive account of the events; nevertheless, they
suggest that the minimum wage might had a negative effect at least on marginal employ-
ment and on Aufstocker. However, these graphs do not account for the differences in
the strength of the treatment and possible pre-trend differences in deterministic trends.
Additionally, the series are noisy, due to the presence of seasonality. In this section, these
concerns will be addressed.
Another goal of this section is to answer two important questions concerning the
regression specification. First, whether the left-hand side of the equation should be
specified in log-levels (Equation 1) or in growth rates (Equation 2), and second, whether to
include a pre-treatment trend differential or not. As outlined in Section 3.1, identification
hinges on the so-called common trend assumption (CTA), which is not directly testable.
However, if for a certain specification more and less heavily treated counties move parallel
before the policy change, one would be more confident hat under the absence of the new
policy, the parallel movement would have continued also after the policy change. Thus,
this section compares graphically the different specifications.21
In order to ease the graphical exposition, treatment won’t be based on the continuous
bite, but on the binary treatment indicator.22 The resulting two time series are normalized
by the average value in January 2012 (for levels specification) or 2013 (for the growth rate
specification) respectively.23 As in Figure 4, a vertical dark blue line indicates the official
start of the minimum wage in January 2015; a light-blue vertical line six months before
indicates the the passing of the law in July 2014.
Concerning the first question, the specification of the left-hand side, the time series
for the levels specification is based on the residuals of a regression on time and county
dummies. For the growth rate specification, the time series is differenced. As it is evident
from Figure 4, all four outcomes exhibit strong seasonal patterns. The levels approach
treats these patterns deterministically with a set of time-specific fixed effects, while the
growth rate approach removes the seasonality stochastically by differencing.
For the second question, the pros and cons for the inclusion of a pre-treatment trend
differential, the resulting time series can also be adjusted by the interaction of a trend
21Besides this graphical exposition, I will report in Section 4 the estimated coefficients of the pre-treatment
trend differentials. Note that a test of their statistical significance cannot directly test the CTA, since
the assumption refers to the hypothetical behavior after the policy change.
22Conveniently, one can compare the movements of two distinct groups, rather than 402 different counties.
Treatment and control group are averages of their respective counties, weighted by the county-specific
regular employment in December 2013. Recall that in the binary treatment counties are treated if the
bite is above the median bite; otherwise, counties belong to the control group. The resulting binary
treatment is displayed in a map (Figure A2, left panel) in the Appendix.
23Hence, values can be interpreted as percentage changes relative to January 2013 net of seasonal effects.
The structure of the graph is similar to Figure 1 in Angrist and Krueger (1999) referring to the Mariel
Boatlift study by Card (1990).
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term (linear, quadratic, or in logs) with the region-specific bite.24 Due to this adjustment,
the values for this graph can no longer be read as a seasonally adjusted growth rate
relative to the first period. The resulting series are the ones to be compared for the
plausibility of the CTA, conditional on a deterministic pre-treatment trend differential.25
Concerning the first question, the graphical analysis suggests that the log-levels
specification is not appropriate to distinguish seasonality and trend behavior. The
graphs without trend differential and a linear trend differential for the four outcome
variables are shown in the Appendix in Tables A4 to A7. The seasonal pattern is not
entirely removed and there remain important differences between counties above and
below the median. Hence, I will not consider the log-levels specification except for a
robustness check and focus on the specification in growth rates (Equation 2). Thus,
all remaining graphs in this section are seasonally adjusted by taking the 12-month
difference. Additionally, the graphs are centered relative to the value for January 2013.
Figure 5 shows the two relevant graphs for the growth rates of regular employment.
The upper panel shows seasonally adjusted data, the lower panel additionally corrects for
a deterministic trend differential. In the upper panel, the two lines move parallel almost
everywhere, except a short period in Spring 2014. A common trend appears plausible,
and there seems to be no striking effect after the introduction of the minimum wage.
In the graphs controlling for a trend differential, the movements before treatment are
similar but less congruent. Thus, the graphical analysis speaks in favor of a specification
without an additional trend differential.
For marginal employment, the two corresponding graphs are displayed in Figure 6.
The upper and the lower panel appear to be very similar. In both cases, treatment and
control group move parallel and almost horizontal until the minimum wage comes into
effect. Both series experience a drop at the turn of the year; however, the one in the
treatment group is much more pronounced. Recall that the smaller drop in the control
regions is likely also related to the minimum wage, given that also the control group is
partially treated, but only to a lesser extent.
Figure 7 displays the development of the growth rates of the Aufstocker. Contrary to
the employment outcomes, there seems to be a clear discrepancy between the treatment
and the control group before the introduction of the minimum wage. If one does not con-
trol for a trend differential (upper panel), the CTA appears implausible. Fortunately, the
picture changes, once one controls for a simple linear trend differential. The movements
of the control and the treatment are parallel until the introduction of the minimum wage.
In 2015 a large discrepancy appears between the two groups.
The last of the four outcomes in growth rates, the non-working UBII recipients, are
displayed in Figure 8. There are apparent similarities to the graphs for the Aufstocker in
24Technically, the seasonally adjusted values are regressed on the bite-trend interaction for the sample
from January 2013 till December 2014. The remainder of the procedure described above is performed
on the predicted (out of sample) residuals from this regression.
25I will focus on a linear trend specification. The resulting graphs for the growth rate specification with a
quadratic polynomial or a logarithmic trend differential are shown in the Appendix (Figures A8 to A11)
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Figure 7. Without any trend correction, the CTA seems implausible. However, as soon as
one controls for a deterministic linear trend differential, the movements align. Unlike
the Aufstocker, there is no strong indication for a diverging movement of the treatment
group after the policy change.
Summing Up The graphical inspection of the binary treatment and control groups
indicates that the growth rates specification is more appropriate than the specification
in log-levels. Additionally, the CTA should be satisfied for the two employment outcomes
without any inclusion of pre-treatment trend differentials. For the two outcomes studying
welfare dependency however, a specification with a deterministic trend differential seems
more plausible. The graphical analysis suggests the presence of effects for marginal
employment and the Aufstocker. For regular employment and non-working UBII the
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4 Results
This section presents the results from fixed effects regressions as described in Section 3.
As argued in the previous Section 3.4, the main specification will be in growth rates of
the outcomes of interest (Equation 2). Note that in order to ease interpretation of the
estimated coefficients, the county-specific bite of the minimum wage is normalized by
its standard deviation and divided by 100. Thus, βˆ gives the percentage point change of
the growth rate of the respective outcome (regular or marginal employment, Aufstocker,
non-working UBII) due to one additional standard deviation of the bite.26 All tables will
also report the overall, as well as the between and the within R2 measure. The between R2
represents the explained variation if the time-dimension would be collapsed on county
level. The within R2 provides the goodness of fit for the mean detrended data, neglecting
all variation across counties.
Employment Table 3 shows the effects of the minimum wage on employment out-
comes. The upper panel displays the results for regular employment, the lower panel for
marginal employment. Column (1) is the standard model from Equation 2, including
time and county fixed effects, but no trend differential. As it was argued in the graph-
ical analysis in Section 3.4, column (1) is the preferred specification for both, regular
and marginal employment. The corresponding graphs are the upper panels in Figure 5
and 6. The specification in column (2) additionally includes bitei · t ·δ, i.e. a linear trend
differential proportional to the bite. This specification corresponds to the lower panels
in Figure 5 and 6. As additional robustness checks, column (3) specifies a polynomial
quadratic trend differential, column (4) a logarithmic one.27
For regular employment, all four specifications have a negative point estimate and
thus indicate that the minimum wage reduced the growth rate of regular employment.
The graphical analysis spoke in favor of the specification in column (1). The estimated
coefficient implies that one standard deviation of the bite decreases the growth rate of
employment by about 0.1 percentage points, significant at the 10% level. Given that the
average bite is about two times the standard deviation, one could argue that such an
effect does not appear to be economically significant. However, if the minimum wage
would permanently depresses the growth rate of employment, the long-run effect could
potentially be very large.
The choice of the functional form of the pre-treatment trend behavior appears to
be influential, even though the differences across the bite coefficients are not always
significant. Table 3 also reports the estimated trend coefficients; the linear and the log-
trend differential are not statistically significant, while the quadratic trend differential
26In a robustness check, also the log-levels specification will be estimated. Here, βˆL corresponds to the
percentage change in the outcome variable due to one additional standard deviation of the bite.
27The corresponding graphs are shown in the Appendix in Figure A8 and A9.
25
is jointly highly significant.28 Thus, on statistical grounds, one could argue that the
specification from column (3) with a quadratic trend should be the preferred one. In that
case, the effect of one standard deviation becomes very small and is no longer statistically
different from zero at conventional levels of significance.
For marginal employment, the lower panel of Table 3 shows that effect on growth rate
of marginal employment is more pronounced than the one on regular employment. This
is in line with Figure 4 and previous evidence on the employment effects of the minimum
wage. In the preferred specification, an additional standard deviation of the bite reduces
the growth rate by 1.4 percentage points. This estimate is reduced to about 1 percentage
point, if one controls for a pre-trend differential, regardless of the trend’s functional
form. Regarding the significance of the estimated trend differentials, all three trend
differentials are statistically significant at least at the 5% level.29 All three specifications
including a trend differential indicate more or less the same effect of a 1 percentage point
reduction of the growth rate. Thus, there is strong evidence that the minimum wage had
a negative effect on marginal employment. Given that all point estimates for regular
employment are negative, the results so far do not suggest that marginal jobs have been
upgraded to regular jobs on a massive scale.
28The F-test of joint significance of the linear and quadratic trend differential has a test statistic of 6.0881
with an associated p-value of 0.0025.
29The F-test of joint significance of the linear and quadratic trend differential has a test statistic of 3.3733
with an associated p-value of 0.0353.
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Table 3: Effects on Employment Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regular Employment
Bite·2015 -0.096∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.040 -0.170∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.060) (0.041) (0.057)
t × Bite 0.001 0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003)
t 2 × Bite -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
log(t ) × Bite 0.035
(0.022)
Observations 14472 14472 14472 14472
R2 within 0.171 0.171 0.173 0.172
R2 between 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.177
R2 overall 0.097 0.058 0.001 0.000
Marginal Employment
Bite·2015 -1.359∗∗∗ -0.995∗∗∗ -1.133∗∗∗ -1.065∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.245) (0.229) (0.240)
t × Bite -0.006∗∗∗ -0.015
(0.002) (0.010)
t 2 × Bite 0.000
(0.000)
log(t ) × Bite -0.138∗∗
(0.055)
Observations 14472 14472 14472 14472
R2 within 0.306 0.308 0.308 0.308
R2 between 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.110
R2 overall 0.249 0.249 0.231 0.196
Bite measured in December 2013 and normalized by one SD
Estimation including Time and County Fixed Effects
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Welfare Dependency While there already exist several studies about the employment
effects, ex-post evidence on the effects of the minimum wage on the Aufstocker and
welfare dependency is scarce. At the time of writing, there is only the descriptive study
by Bruckmeier and Wiemers (2016), reporting an unusually large reduction of the Auf-
stocker at the turn of the year 2014/15 which is also present in the descriptive Figure 4 in
Section 3.3.
Table 4 follows the same structure as Table 3, but this time for the two welfare-related
outcomes. The number of observations is slightly smaller, since the number of welfare re-
cipients are sometimes missing in the original data. Recall from the graphical exposition
in Section 3.4 that for both welfare outcomes column (2) (linear trend differential) was
preferred over the specification without any trend differential. For the Aufstocker, all four
point estimates are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The preferred
specification in column (2) indicates that one standard deviation of the bite reduces the
growth rate of the Aufstocker by 1.4 percentage points. The point estimate from column
(1) without and trend differential is substantially larger with 2.6 percentage points. This
discrepancy was already indicated in the graphical exposition in Section 3.4, as the dif-
ference between the upper and lower panel of Figure 7. Concerning the estimated trend
differentials, all three trend specifications are (jointly) statistically significant In sum, the
results point without any doubt to a reduction of the the growth rate of the Aufstocker.
For the other welfare-related outcome, the growth rate of non-working UBII recipi-
ents, the results do not draw such a clear picture. The sign of the point estimate switches
from negative to positive, if one includes any form of trend differential. The preferred
estimate in column (2) with a linear trend differential indicates a small and significant
increase in the growth rate of non-working UBII recipients by 0.3 percentage points due
to one additional standard deviation of the bite. The other two trend-corrected speci-
fications result in smaller and insignificant point estimates. All trend terms are highly
significant. Thus, it is difficult to conclude which of the specifications is the most credible
and consequently, whether there is a significant increase in the non-working welfare
recipients. In any case, given that the strong effect for the Aufstocker is not matched by
an equally striking effect on the non-working UBII recipients, the results from Table 4
suggest that the reduction in the Aufstocker is not entirely due to lost supplementary
jobs, but potentially also due to increased labor earnings of the Aufstocker.
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Table 4: Effects on Welfare Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aufstocker
Bite·2015 -2.617∗∗∗ -1.460∗∗∗ -1.249∗∗∗ -1.745∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.209) (0.155) (0.198)
t × Bite -0.018∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.003) (0.012)
t 2 × Bite -0.000
(0.000)
log(t ) × Bite -0.411∗∗∗
(0.074)
Observations 14298 14298 14298 14298
R2 within 0.238 0.248 0.249 0.247
R2 between 0.530 0.533 0.532 0.534
R2 overall 0.283 0.382 0.368 0.352
Non-working UBII
Bite·2015 -0.635∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗ 0.091 0.143
(0.109) (0.139) (0.108) (0.131)
t × Bite -0.015∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.008)
t 2 × Bite 0.000∗∗
(0.000)
log(t ) × Bite -0.367∗∗∗
(0.051)
Observations 14298 14298 14298 14298
R2 within 0.105 0.120 0.121 0.121
R2 between 0.446 0.446 0.446 0.446
R2 overall 0.111 0.294 0.296 0.279
Bite measured in December 2013 and normalized by one SD
Estimation including Time and County Fixed Effects
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Back-of-the-envelope The specification in growth rates and with a continuous treat-
ment has the important drawback that it is difficult to translate the results into an easily
understandable effect size. It is for instance not clear for which time horizon the mini-
mum wage will affect the growth rates. It is unlikely that the minimum wage only has an
impact in 2015. On the other hand, if the measured impact was permanent, it would be
implausibly high in the long run. Concerning the treatment, it is not clear how many
standard deviations should be the yardstick for the effect of the policy. Table 5 presents
back-of-the-envelope calculations for the implied size of the short-run effect in 2015,
using two standard deviations - which is about the size of the mean bite - as the preferred
multiplier. The estimates should not be taken as the definite treatment effect of the mini-
mum wage, but illustrate the order of magnitude of the implied effects. The calculations
in Table 5 use the stock of the outcomes in December 2013. The βˆ -coefficients are those
without adjustment for a trend-differential for employment outcomes (Column (1) in Ta-
ble 3) and those with a linear trend-differential for the two welfare outcomes (Column (2)
in Table 4).30
Table 5: Effects of Preferred Specifications
Employment Welfare
Regular Marginal Aufstocker NW-UBII
Stock in 2013 29,883,573 7,438,102 1,298,297 3,016,337
βˆ -0.096 -1.359 -1.460 0.321
Effect +1 SD -28,688 -101,084 -18,955 9,682
Effect +2 SD -57,376 -202,168 -37,910 19,365
Back-of-the-envelope calculation, short-run effects in 2015
For regular employment, the effect of two standard deviations corresponds to about
60,000 less jobs due to the minimum wage. Compared to the stock of employment of
about 30 million employees, and the large predicted long-run effect of some of the ex-
ante studies, this short-run effect is comparatively small. Additionally, the effect does
not appear to be robust to the inclusion of pre-treatment trend differentials.31 Note
that this calculation does not imply that existing jobs are lost, but that the job creation
dynamics are hampered. As it is displayed in the employment graphs in Figure 4, regular
employment followed an upward trajectory in recent years. Knabe et al. (2016) also argue
that the minimum wage did not destroy existing jobs but did reduce job creation. For
30Given that tests on the statistical significance of the pre-treatment trend differentials in Tables 3 and 4
did not provide a clear guidance, this choice is somewhat arbitrary. Especially the results for regular
employment and non-working welfare recipients have to be taken with a pinch of salt. I decided to stick
to the preferred specifications of the graphical analysis, since these are credible, but also parsimonious.
31For the specification with a quadratic trend differential, the effect would essentially zero.
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marginal employment, the effect of two standard deviations of the bite is about 200,000
lost marginal jobs or about 150,000 for the robustness check including a trend differential
For the level of marginal employment, the figures and the estimation results indicate an
actual (and not only counter-factual) reduction due to the minimum wage, which is also
in line with previous research, such as Groll (2015) or Garloff (2016).
For the welfare outcomes, the two standard deviations imply a reduction of about
38,000 Aufstocker and an partially offsetting increase in the number of non-working
UBII recipients by about 19,000. This calculations suggest that roughly one half of the
reduction in the Aufstocker was due to the loss of a supplementary job, instead of an
increase in the household income. However, the effect on non-working UBII has to be
taken with a pinch of salt, because the estimated coefficients fluctuate considerably. The
very small absolute reduction of the Aufstocker due to the minimum wage also confirms
the previous literature, which pointed to the limited effectiveness of minimum wages for
reducing welfare dependency.
Dierences between East and West Germany Table 6 uses only variation in the bite
within East and West Germany.32 The table presents only the preferred specification, i.e.
without any pre-treatment trend differential for the two employment outcomes (column
1 and 2), but with a linear trend differential for the two welfare related outcomes (column
3 and 4). The Upper panel shows the results for West Germany, the lower panel for the
East.
Concerning employment outcomes within West Germany, the result suggest positive
job dynamics in counties more heavily affected by the minimum wage: The growth
rate of marginal employment is reduced by about 0.6 percentage points, however, this
reduction appears to be offset by an increase of the growth rate of regular employment
of almost 0.3 percentage points. Give the relative magnitudes of the two types of em-
ployment, this pattern can be seen as evidence for upgrading of marginal into regular
jobs due to the minimum wage. For East Germany however, both point estimates for
the employment outcomes are negative and relatively large, even though they are not
statistically significant at conventional levels.
For the welfare outcomes within West Germany, the point estimate for the Aufstocker
is positive but not significant. For the non-working UBII recipients, the results indicate a
statistically significant reduction of the growth by about 1 percentage point. The welfare
effects in the West are difficult to reconcile. For East Germany however, the growth of
the Aufstocker is reduced by 2.3 percentage points, while the growth of non-working
UBII recipients increases by 0.9 percentage points. Thus, the overall effects on welfare
dependency shown in Table 4 seem to be driven by changes in the East. Given the relative
magnitudes of working and non-working welfare recipients, the estimates suggest that
most of the Aufstocker in the East ended up in non-working welfare dependency.
32The corresponding maps of the bite are shown in the Appendix in Figure A1.
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On balance, the results from this sample split paint a rather positive picture of the
short-run effects of the minimum wage in West Germany and a negative for the East.
In the West, some marginal jobs seem to be upgraded due to the minimum wage. This
dynamic is not present in the East, where some of the Aufstocker appear to have lost
their supplementary jobs. These differences echo the findings of Knabe et al. (2014) and
the concerns in the public debate whether a universally set minimum wage could be
workable in the west, but too high for the east of Germany.
Table 6: Variation within West and East Germany
Employment Welfare
Regular Marginal Aufstocker NW UBII
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West Germany
Bite·2015 0.280∗∗ -0.659∗∗ 0.796 -1.010∗∗
(0.124) (0.262) (0.717) (0.471)
Observations 11700 11700 11558 11558
R2 within 0.183 0.279 0.078 0.103
R2 between 0.003 0.017 0.050 0.034
R2 overall 0.095 0.208 0.066 0.068
East Germany
Bite·2015 -0.287 -0.955 -2.330∗∗∗ 0.900∗
(0.188) (0.971) (0.495) (0.463)
Observations 2772 2772 2740 2740
R2 within 0.190 0.347 0.735 0.299
R2 between 0.088 0.002 0.057 0.169
R2 overall 0.117 0.264 0.639 0.224
Linear Trend - - Ø Ø
Time Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
County Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Bite measured in December 2013 and normalized by one SD
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Composition of the Aufstocker While there seems to be an overall reduction of the
growth rate of the Aufstocker, it remains to be seen which group was affected most
32
severely by the minimum wage. Table 7 shows the effects on four different Aufstocker
subgroups, namely self-employed and Mini-, Midi- and Maxijobs. As for the parent
category - Aufstocker - a linear trend differential is included. Note that the number of
observations differs slightly for the self-employed due to data availability.
The effect on the self-employed is not statistically significant, which is not surprising,
since a minimum wage should not directly affect self-employed Aufstocker. The three
groups of dependently employed Aufstocker however, all feature statistically significant
reductions of their growth rates. The relative effect is the largest for midi and maxi jobs.
Especially for those with already relatively high earnings, it is plausible that some have
left welfare dependency entirely.
Table 7: Composition of Aufstocker
Self-empl. Mini Job Midi Job Maxi Job
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bite·2015 -0.834 -0.786∗∗∗ -2.676∗∗∗ -2.357∗∗∗
(0.733) (0.278) (0.455) (0.401)
Linear Trend Ø Ø Ø Ø
Time Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
County Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Observations 14294 14298 14298 14298
R2 within 0.012 0.296 0.108 0.068
R2 between 0.126 0.485 0.061 0.419
R2 overall 0.018 0.366 0.083 0.168
Bite measured in December 2013 and normalized by one SD
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Wages This section analyzes whether the introduction of the minimum wage actually
affected labor earnings. Table 8 shows the results from OLS regressions where the bite
measured in 2013 is related to the county-specific growth rate of labor earnings between
2013 and 2015 (upper panel) or to the level of monthly earnings in 2015, controlling for
the average level in the county in 2013. Hence, the estimated coefficients in the upper
panel can be read as the effect on the growth rate of earnings in percentage points, due
to one additional standard deviation of the bite. In the lower panel, the coefficients
provides the income change in Euro due to one additional standard deviation of the bite.
All earnings information are taken from the wage statistics (Statistik der Bundesagentur
für Arbeit, 2016c).
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Table 8: Earnings and Earnings Growth between 2013 and 2015
Avg income Up to 1400 Up to 1500 1500 to 2000 Above 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Earnings Growth 2015-2013
Bite 0.716∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 1.423∗∗∗ -0.027 -0.891∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.067) (0.064) (0.019) (0.044)
Observations 402 402 402 402 402
R2 0.319 0.090 0.556 0.005 0.515
Monthly Earnings 2015
Bite 22.77∗∗∗ 8.27∗∗∗ 18.52∗∗∗ -2.82∗∗∗ -27.22∗∗∗
(2.761) (1.032) (1.013) (0.498) (1.911)
Observations 402 402 402 402 402
R2 0.996 0.847 0.896 0.683 0.995
Bite measured in December 2013 and normalized by one SD. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Earnings Growth is Income 2015−Income 2013Income 2013 .
The effect on monthly earnings 2015 is conditional on average monthly earnings in 2013
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Column (1) shows specifications which do not condition on the income level, in
column (2) the outcomes are based on the average income of those earning up to 1400€,
in column (3) the threshold is raised to 1500€, in column (4) of the average income
between 1500 and 2000€ per month. Column (5) shows the outcomes based on the aver-
age income of those earning more than 2000€ per month. There are positive statistically
significant effects for the first three columns, i.e. overall earnings and earnings that are
likely affected by the minimum wage The largest relative effect is found column (3), i.e.
for those earning slightly more than the minimum wage. This pattern provides strong
evidence for a positive effect of the policy on wages. There is no significant earnings
growth for those earning between 1500 and 2000€ per month. Also the absolute change
for this group does not seem to be economically significant. Thus, there is no evidence
for strong positive spillover effects across the wage distribution. The average income of
those earning above 2000€, a group which is likely not affected by the minimum wage,
is negatively related to the bite.
Robustness In the following, I will discuss the results from various robustness checks.
All related tables are delegated to the Appendix. Tables A1 contains the employment
effects for the levels specification (Equation 1) and follows the same structure as Table 3,
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hence compares the four different specifications of the pre-treatment trend differential.
Remember that in this specification, the estimated coefficients do not provide an effect
on the growth rate in percentage points, but a percentage change of the outcomes.
Concerning regular employment, the preferred specification implies a reduction of
employment by about 0.8 percent due to an additional standard deviation of the bite. All
four specifications show a negative effect, but controlling for a trend differential reduces
the estimated coefficients considerably. The relative effect on marginal employment is
more pronounced: In the preferred specification, an additional standard deviation of
the bite reduces marginal employment by 1.8%. Recall from the graphical analysis in
Section 3.4 that the common trend assumption did not appear to hold and thus might
be misleading. Nevertheless, the levels specifications would point to similar conclusions
as the specification in growth rates.
Tables A2 provides the welfare counterpart in levels to Table A1. The specification
in levels with a linear trend differential indicates that for the Aufstocker one additional
standard deviation of the bite reduces the stock by 2.7% . Also all other point estimates
are negative and statistically significant, even though their validity is questionable, since
the common trend assumption is likely not to hold. For non-working UBII recipients,
not all point estimates have the same sign, even though the standard errors point to
rather precise estimates. For non-working UBII, also in the log-levels specification, the
point estimates oscillate wildly with the chosen specification of the pre-treatment trend
differential.
Table A3 summarizes the results from the alternative specification of the growth
rate (Equation 3) with anticipation effects and adjustment over time. The employment
outcomes are displayed in column (1) and (2). The two specifications do include any pre-
treatment differential. The welfare-related outcomes are displayed in column (3) and (4)
and are estimated including a linear trend differential. The anticipation period starts with
July 2014, after the minimum wage bill was passed and hence consists of the six month
in the second half of 2014. The adjustment period starts in January 2015 and includes all
months until June 2015. The last six months of 2015 are grouped together. For regular
employment, the first statistically significant effects arise form October 2014 onwards,
for marginal employment from November 2014 onwards. For the welfare outcomes,
there is no striking significant anticipation apart from small positive and significant
effects just in the month of August 2014. On Balance, the found patterns do not point to
any considerable anticipation effects. If one redefines the start of the treatment from
January 2015 to October 2014 (the month with the first significant employment effects),
and ignores the adjustment procedure over time, the effects remain largely unaffected.
Given that the identification rests on a difference-in-differences framework and
that there are multiple time periods, it is natural to test the validity of the identification
strategy using a placebo treatment. Table A4 reports the preferred estimates for all four
outcomes (no trend differential for the employment and a linear trend differential for
the welfare outcomes) on a treatment that starts in January 2014 and ends in December
2014. The information from 2015 is discarded. Ideally, the estimated effects of this
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pseudo treatment would be close to zero and not statistically significant. Indeed, this
is the case for regular employment and non-working UBII recipients. The coefficient
for the Aufstocker indicates a change of the growth rate by 0.2 percentage points, even
though it is not statstically significant at conventional levels. The growth rate of marginal
employment is reduced by 0.3 percentage points and significant at the one percent
level. This casts some doubts at the identification strategy. Nevertheless, the estimated
pseudo-effects are much smaller than the preferred estimates and would be considered
not economically significant.
The main analysis so far did not distinguish between female and male employees.
Table A5 shows variation within men and women and also another variant in which both
gender types are used together. The latter corresponds to the "gender cell" specification
in Garloff (2016) and only shows the preferred specifications of the pre-treatment trend
behavior. In all three gender specification, there is no effect on regular employment, but
always a reduction of the growth rate of marginal employment by about 1 percentage
point. For the growth rate of the Aufstocker all three gender specifications find negative
effects. However, the effect sizes differ considerably across samples. Concerning non-
working UBII recipients, the effects vary from zero for the male sample to a positive effect
of about 0.4 for women and -0.4 percentage points for the gender cells approach. Taken
together, the results from Table A5 confirm the discussion about the emplyoment welfare
effects estimated in Table 3 and 4: The minimum wage has a negligible effect on regular,
but a very robust negative effect on marginal employment and on the Aufstocker. The
effect on the growth rate of non-working UBII is rather sensitive to the chosen estimation
method and thus not very reliable.
Table A6 shows the effects for alternative binary treatments, used for instance in the
graphs assessing the validity of the common trend assumption. Treated and not-treated
counties are displayed in Figure A2. These specifications show strong significant negative
effects on the growth rate of marginal employment and on the Aufstocker. The other two
outcomes are not significant in this specification. Table A7 repeats the same exercise,
but this time with alternative definitions of the bite, namely with 1400€ or 2000€ as
the threshold of monthly gross earnings. Changing the threshold for the bite only mildly
affect the estimated coefficients and leaves the detected patterns unchanged.
Table A8 uses a coarser level of aggregation, namely labor market regions instead of
counties. The advantage of this approach is that it rests on variation across labor market
regions which might be more relevant for the impact of the minimum wage. The regions
are defined following Eckey et al. (2007), based on observed commuting patterns. Also
this robustness check confirms strong significant negative effects on the growth rate of
marginal employment and on the Aufstocker, but does not find significant effects for the
other two outcomes.
To sum up, the vast majority of robustness checks confirm the existence of negative
effects on marginal employment and on the Aufstocker. The effect on regular employ-
ment, which is quite small in the preferred specification frequently vanishes entirely, if
one modifies the estimation strategy. Thus, one can conclude that there are only very
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small or even no considerable effects on regular employment. The effect on non-working
UBII recipients does not appear to be robust.
5 Discussion
This study examines the effects of the German statutory minimum Wage on employment
and welfare dependency, using a difference-in-differences framework. The German labor
market remained in a seemingly strong position after the introduction of the minimum
wage with no striking immediate negative repercussions. However, this study finds
evidence for a comparatively large reduction in marginal employment. Concerning
regular employment, there is some evidence for an overall small negative effect, even
though it does not appear to be very robust. For West Germany, there is some evidence
that the loss of marginal employment is offset by conversions into regular employment.
In general, the results confirm the findings of previous ex-post studies on the (modest)
short-run employment implications of the statutory minimum wage.
Concerning welfare dependency, there is a reduction in the number of the Aufstocker,
i.e. recipients of unemployment benefit II while working. However, as already argued
by Müller and Steiner (2009); Bruckmeier and Wiemers (2014) this effect does not need
to imply an improvement in the economic situation of the affected households, since
withdrawal rates of the supplementary welfare payments are high. Nevertheless, there
might be strong effects on subjective well-being, due to the elimination of welfare stigma
(Hetschko et al., 2016) and a partial relief for social spendings. For West Germany there is
no indication that the reduction in the growth rate of the Aufstocker was caused by them,
loosing their job and ending up in non-working welfare receipts. For East Germany on
the other hand, there is evidence that a considerable share of the Aufstocker did so.
The analysis only considers the short-run effects in the first year after the introduction
of the minimum wage. Thus, the results cannot give a proper indication of the total effect
or the impact of the minimum wage during the next economic recession and recovery.
Additionally, the minimum wage might have some harmful medium to long-run effects
in strongly affected regions due to location and investment decisions which have yet
to take effect. Firms could invest in new machines which are less labor intensive or
firms could decide to relocate to other areas due to a change in the relative prices for
labor among regions. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to study the immediate effects of the
minimum wage directly after its introduction. The short-run loss of about 200,000 jobs
in marginal employment is substantial. This finding at least casts some doubts at the
sentiment that the minimum wage was free from side effects. Last but not least, if the
detected reduction in the growth rate of regular employment turns out to be permanent,
the resulting long-run effect on employment will be substantial.
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Figure A1: Bite within West and East Germany - Map and Kernel Density
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Figure A11: Non-working UBII - Further Trend Specifications
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Table A1: Effects on Employment Outcomes - Levels Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regular Employment
Bite·2015 -0.826∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.519∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.048) (0.030) (0.050)
t × Bite -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
t 2 × Bite 0.000
(0.000)
log(t ) × Bite -0.078∗∗∗
(0.012)
Observations 19296 19296 19296 19296
R2 within 0.707 0.718 0.718 0.715
R2 between 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
R2 overall 0.003 0.009 0.010 0.014
Marginal Employment
Bite·2015 -1.825∗∗∗ -1.343∗∗∗ -1.057∗∗∗ -1.604∗∗∗
(0.265) (0.195) (0.171) (0.208)
t × Bite -0.006∗∗ 0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
t 2 × Bite -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
log(t ) × Bite -0.056∗
(0.029)
Observations 19296 19296 19296 19296
R2 within 0.291 0.294 0.295 0.293
R2 between 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.201
R2 overall 0.018 0.045 0.032 0.058
Bite measured in December 2013 and normalized by one SD
Estimation including Time and County Fixed Effects
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2: Effects on Welfare Outcomes - Levels Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aufstocker
Bite·2015 -6.347∗∗∗ -2.699∗∗∗ -1.452∗∗∗ -4.662∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.149) (0.107) (0.172)
t × Bite -0.042∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗
(0.003) (0.005)
t 2 × Bite -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
log(t ) × Bite -0.433∗∗∗
(0.030)
Observations 19177 19177 19177 19177
R2 within 0.498 0.560 0.564 0.540
R2 between 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071
R2 overall 0.004 0.027 0.021 0.037
Non-working UBII
Bite·2015 -4.069∗∗∗ -0.650∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ -2.460∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.113) (0.096) (0.145)
t × Bite -0.040∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
t 2 × Bite -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
log(t ) × Bite -0.413∗∗∗
(0.023)
Observations 19177 19177 19177 19177
R2 within 0.410 0.504 0.507 0.476
R2 between 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
R2 overall 0.002 0.020 0.016 0.027
Bite measured in December 2013 and normalized by one SD
Estimation including Time and County Fixed Effects
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A3: Anticipation and Adjustment Effects
Employment Welfare
Regular Marginal Aufstocker NW UBII
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bite·07/2014 0.025 -0.145 0.218 0.003
(0.041) (0.153) (0.137) (0.090)
Bite·08/2014 -0.044 -0.242 0.370∗ 0.233∗∗
(0.044) (0.153) (0.195) (0.111)
Bite·09/2014 -0.055 -0.212 0.229 0.196
(0.047) (0.155) (0.230) (0.130)
Bite·10/2014 -0.119∗∗ -0.235 0.123 0.113
(0.048) (0.159) (0.244) (0.151)
Bite·11/2014 -0.111∗∗ -0.395∗ 0.056 0.181
(0.049) (0.210) (0.273) (0.170)
Bite·12/2014 -0.105∗∗ -0.525∗∗ -0.067 0.293
(0.052) (0.215) (0.281) (0.186)
Bite·01/2015 -0.065 -1.484∗∗∗ -0.462 0.340∗
(0.054) (0.235) (0.320) (0.198)
Bite·02/2015 -0.042 -1.479∗∗∗ -1.040∗∗∗ 0.409∗
(0.057) (0.241) (0.343) (0.218)
Bite·03/2015 -0.077 -1.510∗∗∗ -1.223∗∗∗ 0.320
(0.060) (0.245) (0.381) (0.232)
Bite·04/2015 -0.119∗∗ -1.501∗∗∗ -1.530∗∗∗ 0.460∗
(0.058) (0.252) (0.407) (0.240)
Bite·05/2015 -0.154∗∗ -1.430∗∗∗ -1.636∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗
(0.062) (0.257) (0.430) (0.255)
Bite·06/2015 -0.149∗∗ -1.397∗∗∗ -1.832∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗
(0.062) (0.256) (0.437) (0.265)
Bite·HY2/2015 -0.126∗∗ -1.398∗∗∗ -1.664∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗
(0.058) (0.223) (0.474) (0.291)
Observations 14472 14472 14298 14298
R2 within 0.172 0.308 0.252 0.121
R2 between 0.177 0.110 0.533 0.446
R2 overall 0.105 0.252 0.382 0.297
Linear Trend - - Ø Ø
Time Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
County Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Bite measured in December 2013 and normalized by one SD
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses




Regular Marginal Aufstocker NW UBII
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bite· 2014 0.072 -0.329∗∗∗ 0.222 0.084
(0.049) (0.125) (0.146) (0.085)
Observations 9648 9648 9533 9533
R2 within 0.092 0.039 0.078 0.109
R2 between 0.128 0.012 0.322 0.356
R2 overall 0.021 0.028 0.197 0.253
Linear Trend - - Ø Ø
Time Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
County Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Bite measured in December 2013 and normalized by one SD
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A5: Variation within Gender
Employment Welfare
Regular Marginal Aufstocker NW UBII
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men
Bite·2015 0.013 -1.184∗∗∗ -0.858∗∗ 0.050
(0.078) (0.293) (0.334) (0.195)
Observations 14472 14472 14298 14298
R2 within 0.116 0.258 0.103 0.067
R2 between 0.103 0.121 0.394 0.393
R2 overall 0.060 0.214 0.189 0.160
Women
Bite·2015 -0.050 -1.301∗∗∗ -1.418∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.181) (0.230) (0.140)
Observations 14472 14472 14297 14297
R2 within 0.203 0.277 0.198 0.055
R2 between 0.104 0.085 0.426 0.347
R2 overall 0.104 0.220 0.288 0.198
Gender Cells
Bite·2015 0.035 -0.968∗∗∗ -1.608∗∗∗ -0.445∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.166) (0.211) (0.122)
Observations 28944 28944 28595 28595
R2 within 0.132 0.258 0.107 0.053
R2 between 0.017 0.200 0.211 0.274
R2 overall 0.062 0.211 0.140 0.126
Linear Trend - - Ø Ø
Time Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
County Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Bite measured in December 2013 and normalized by one SD
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A6: Binary Treatment
Employment Welfare
Regular Marginal Aufstocker NW UBII
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Binary Treatment
Treated·2015 0.022 -1.320∗∗∗ -1.398∗∗∗ 0.117
(0.101) (0.383) (0.492) (0.349)
Observations 14472 14472 14298 14298
R2 within 0.168 0.276 0.177 0.107
R2 between 0.050 0.032 0.235 0.173
R2 overall 0.080 0.207 0.204 0.142
Robust Binary Treatment
Treated·2015 0.037 -1.932∗∗∗ -1.711∗∗∗ -0.346
(0.117) (0.392) (0.549) (0.400)
Observations 11592 11592 11455 11455
R2 within 0.156 0.313 0.219 0.112
R2 between 0.072 0.084 0.289 0.239
R2 overall 0.072 0.247 0.253 0.177
Linear Trend - - Ø Ø
Time Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
County Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Bite measured in December 2013 and normalized by one SD
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A7: Alternative Bite Definitions
Employment Welfare
Regular Marginal Aufstocker NW UBII
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bite 1500
Bite·2015 -0.098∗ -1.371∗∗∗ -1.463∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗
(0.050) (0.219) (0.206) (0.138)
Observations 14472 14472 14298 14298
R2 within 0.171 0.307 0.249 0.121
R2 between 0.182 0.114 0.546 0.456
R2 overall 0.097 0.251 0.388 0.301
Bite 2000
Bite·2015 -0.126∗∗ -1.381∗∗∗ -1.495∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗
(0.050) (0.253) (0.202) (0.137)
Observations 14472 14472 14298 14298
R2 within 0.172 0.308 0.247 0.123
R2 between 0.168 0.102 0.571 0.479
R2 overall 0.102 0.249 0.397 0.314
Linear Trend - - Ø Ø
Time Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
County Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Bite measured in December 2013 and normalized by one SD
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A8: Labor Market Regions
Employment Welfare
Regular Marginal Aufstocker NW UBII
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bite·2015 -0.044 -1.799∗∗∗ -1.689∗∗∗ 0.211
(0.097) (0.457) (0.253) (0.225)
Observations 5076 5076 5033 5033
R2 within 0.191 0.283 0.316 0.205
R2 between 0.122 0.141 0.458 0.355
R2 overall 0.106 0.239 0.391 0.278
Linear Trend - - Ø Ø
Time Fixed Effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Labor Market Region FE Ø Ø Ø Ø
Bite measured in December 2013 and normalized by one SD
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
60
Diskussionsbeiträge - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft - Freie Universität Berlin 




2017/1  ARONSSON, Thomas und Ronnie SCHÖB 
  Habit Formation and the Pareto-Efficient Provision of Public Goods 
  Economics 
 
2017/2  VOGT, Charlotte; Martin GERSCH und Cordelia GERTZ 
Governance in integrierten, IT-unterstützten Versorgungskonzepten im 
Gesundheitswesen : eine Analyse aktueller sowie zukünftig möglicher 
Governancestrukturen und -mechanismen 
  Wirtschaftsinformatik 
 
2017/3  VOGT, Charlotte; Martin GERSCH und Hanni KOCH 
Geschäftsmodelle und Wertschöpfungsarchitekturen intersektoraler,  
IT-unterstützter Versorgungskonzepte im Gesundheitswesen 
  Wirtschaftsinformatik 
 
2017/4  DOMBI, Akos und Theocharis GRIGORIADIS 
  Ancestry, Diversity & Finance : Evidence from Transition Economies 
  Economics 
 
2017/5  SCHREIBER, Sven 
  Weather Adjustment of Economic Output 
  Economics 
 
2017/6  NACHTIGALL, Daniel 
Prices versus Quantities: The Impact of Fracking on the Choice of Climate 
Policy Instruments in the Presence of OPEC 
  Economics 
 
2017/7  STOCKHAUSEN, Maximilian 
The Distribution of Economic Resources to Children in Germany 
  Economics 
 
2017/8  HETSCHKO, Clemens; Louisa von REUMONT und Ronnie SCHÖB 
Embedding as a Pitfall for Survey-Based Welfare Indicators: Evidence from an 
Experiment 
  Economics 
 
2017/9  GAENTZSCH, Anja 
Do Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) Raise Educational Attainment? A Case 
Study of Juntos in Peru 





2017/10 BACH, Stefan; Martin BEZNOSKA und Viktor STEINER 
An Integrated Micro Data Base for Tax Analysis in Germany 
  Economics 
 
2017/11 NEUGEBAUER, Martin und Felix WEISS 
Does a Bachelor’s Degree pay off? Labor Market Outcomes of Academic 
versus Vocational Education after Bologna 
  Economics 
 
2017/12 HACHULA, Michael und Dieter NAUTZ 




2017/13 CORNEO, Giacomo 
  Ein Staatsfonds, der eine soziale Dividende finanziert 
  Economics 
 
2017/14 GERSCH, Martin; Cordelia GERTZ und Charlotte VOGT 
Leistungsangebote in integrierten, IT-unterstützten Versorgungskonzepten:  
eine Konzeption (re-) konfigurierbarer Servicemodule im Gesundheitswesen 
  Wirtschaftsinformatik 
 
2017/15 KREUTZMANN, Ann-Kristin; Sören PANNIER; Natalia ROJAS-PERILLA; Timo 
SCHMID; Matthias TEMPL und Nikos TZAVIDIS 
The R Package emdi for Estimating and Mapping 
Regionally Disaggregated Indicators 
Economics 
 
2017/16 VOGT, Charlotte; Cordelia GERTZ und Martin GERSCH 
Ökonomische Evaluation eines integrierten, IT-unterstützten 




2017/17 GASTEIGER, Emanuel und Klaus PRETTNER 
A Note on Automation, Stagnation, and the Implications of a Robot Tax 
Economics 
 
2017/18 HAASE, Michaela 
The Changing Basis of Economic Responsibility: zur Bedeutung und 
Rezeption von John Maurice Clarks Artikel zur ökonomischen Verantwortung 
Marketing 
 
2017/19 FOSSEN, Frank M.; Ray REES; Davud ROSTAM-AFSCHAR und  
Viktor STEINER 




2017/20 NEIDHÖFER, Guido; Joaquín SERRANO und Leonardo GASPARINI 
Educational Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility in Latin America: A 
New Database 
Economics 
 
